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14 Gezi Spirit in the Diaspora
Diffusion of Turkish Politics to Europe
Bahar Baser
The Gezi events constituted a ground-breaking moment in Turkish politi-
cal history. Immediately after the protests sparked in the Gezi Park, they 
spontaneously disseminated and many people from different walks of life 
found themselves trying to influence policymaking procedures in Turkey by 
using civil disobedience and non-violent protest strategies. This momentum 
also crossed the Turkish borders and diffused to the transnational space. 
Indeed, there were solidarity protests in many countries from the US to 
the Netherlands, from Iraq to Russia. Diasporas from Turkey played an 
important role in disseminating what was happening in Turkey to the world 
by informing media institutions as well as hostland politicians and civil 
society organisations about police brutality, censorship and oppression as 
well as the goals of the uprisings in general. They continue to be an integral 
part of the ‘opposition(s)’ that aims to contest AKP rule in Turkey.
Many diaspora groups organised events to commemorate the f irst 
anniversary of the Gezi protests at the beginning of June 2014. Workers’ 
associations from Turkey organised a commemoration march in Duis-
burg to remember the ‘martyrs of Gezi.’1 In Switzerland, various leftist 
organisations and workers’ associations organised an event in front of the 
parliament in Zurich and made declarations regarding the current situation 
in Turkey.2 In the Netherlands, the Taksim Solidarity Group organised 
protests to commemorate the young people who lost their lives as a result 
of police brutality.3 These solidarity events clearly showed that diaspora 
groups from Turkey also appropriated the so-called ‘Gezi Spirit’ and their 
reactions were not a one-off activity; on the contrary, they have a sustained 
interest in keeping up this spirit abroad. Gezi became an over-arching 
transnational metaphor of an expression of dissent about AKP’s policies 
in Turkey. However, the main reason for this sustained activism cannot be 
1  http://www.atik-online.net/2014/06/04/taksim-direnisinin-1-yilinda-tekrar-alanlardayiz/#.
U5Vs8F9wYdU.
2 http://www.atik-online.net/2014/06/08/isvicrede-gezi-direnisi-ruhuyla-tum-sehitler-
anildi/#.U5Vtt19wYdU.
3 http://avegkon.org/avrupada-gezi-direnisi-sehitleri-anildi/.
252 bahar basEr 
explained by the sudden impact of Gezi events; instead, one should look at 
the prior existing mechanisms in order to understand what the Gezi spirit 
is building on.
My aim in this chapter is to analyse how the Gezi events were expe-
rienced in the diaspora, especially in Sweden, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, and to illustrate how diaspora groups from different ethnic, 
religious and ideological backgrounds came together in solidarity with the 
Gezi protestors in Turkey. I show that the alliance-building mechanisms 
took on a different form in each country depending on the political environ-
ment, already existing cooperation mechanisms among diaspora groups, or 
the lack thereof, and the dominant diaspora groups who led the protests in 
different contexts. I particularly focus on alliance-building between Turkish 
and Kurdish diaspora groups in order to contribute to the discussions about 
the Kurdish stance towards Gezi. I also illustrate that the repertoires of 
protests in Turkey inspired the diaspora activists and simulations of Gezi 
were constructed in the diasporic spaces.
The f indings of this chapter are based on semi-structured interviews 
and f ieldwork observations derived from my longitudinal study on both 
Turkish and Kurdish diaspora groups in Europe during my doctoral and 
post-doctoral studies.4 Since the beginning of the Gezi protests in Turkey 
in May-June 2013, I have also been conducting follow-up interviews (face-
to-face or via skype, email or telephone) and following the social media 
discussion groups founded by various diaspora groups in Europe in order 
to keep up to date with the discussions.
Diffusion of Gezi Spirit to the Transnational Space
Diasporas mobilise in a similar way to advocacy groups or other types of 
transnational solidarity networks and they use similar repertoires of action. 
They lobby hostland policymakers in order to achieve their goals as well as 
to raise awareness about their cause. Their existence depends on mobilis-
ing resources, recruiting new members and disseminating their agenda 
into the public spheres of their home and host countries (Sökefeld 2006; 
Shain and Barth 2003; Adamson 2008; Baser and Swain 2008). In a global 
setting, diasporas play the role of ‘cultural brokerage,’ which translates 
4 I was a post-doctoral researcher in a project called ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty,’ 
which has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013ERC, grant agreement number 284198.
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the local messages to a global audience when seminal moments occur in 
the homeland (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 2013). Especially due to 
the new communication technologies, the messages from the homeland 
can be transmitted to the diasporas and through the diasporas to a wider 
audience within seconds. For instance, Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 
(2013) argue that the ‘Syrian diaspora helped to publicize the protests across 
national borders and media platforms’ by playing the broker between 
local activists and the mainstream media. During the uprisings in their 
homelands, Arab diaspora showed a great deal of activism, which some 
authors called the ‘diaspora spring’5 due to the rise in diasporic activism 
throughout the critical junctures in the Middle East. Graziano (2012, 18) 
also illustrates that in the case of the Tunisian diaspora: its web-activism 
created an ‘information highway’ where the censorship of the homeland is 
eluded during the domestic political turmoil. In the case of the Gezi protests, 
we detect a similar fashion but one can also see that the protests were 
performed spatially by using actual protests as well as creative art which 
is highly visible and solid in the transnational space and which has a more 
enduring impact. Although online networks constituted an integral part of 
the Gezi movement at home and abroad, in this article I solely focus on the 
offline activism in the diaspora, which I believe shows the core mechanisms 
that explain the diffusion of the Gezi spirit to the transnational space.
Diasporas are political actors generated as a result of political projects, 
have their own political ambitions and agendas and they try to influence 
home and hostland political mechanisms to achieve these goals. Diasporas 
are not homogenous entities and there might be different ideological, 
religious, ethnic or sectarian divergence within a diaspora group from the 
same homeland (Lyons and Mandaville 2010, 126; Feron 2013, 65). There 
is heterogeneity in terms of loyalties to an ethnic, religious or ideological 
project but there is also variation in terms of the level of activism among 
members of the same diaspora group. Shain and Barth (2003, 452) divide 
the members into three categories: core, passive and silent members. There 
is mobility among different levels of activism and mobilisation and this 
depends on both developments in the homeland and the hostland. Silent 
members can become passive, while dormant members can become active 
because diaspora mobilisations are fluid and complex. Critical events in the 
homeland might kindle interest in homeland politics and turn passive and 
silent members into active members as a result of an impetus to become 
5 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-arab-diaspora-f inds-its-voice/
article4243545/.
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mobilised to make their voice heard. The Gezi events in Turkey were a case 
in point in this regard.
Interestingly enough, the protest mechanisms diffused without delay to 
the diaspora and there were simultaneous protests all around Europe, which 
synchronised their discourses with the main actors of the Gezi protests 
from the TGB to the leftist fractions, from Kurdish diaspora groups to the 
Alevi federations. It should be underlined that the diasporas from Turkey 
had already been engaged in Turkish politics for many years and this was 
not the f irst time that they have organised protests. Gezi was not a miracle 
and it did not create a political activism or awareness from scratch. Kurdish 
diaspora has been politically active and successfully transnationalised its 
agenda since the f irst f low of Kurdish migrants to Europe during the last 
four decades (Baser 2011). Kemalist associations were established since the 
f irst migration flows, the Alevi movement has been one of the strongest 
diasporas from Turkey and leftist movements from Turkey have found 
refuge in Europe through exiled members since the 1970s (Sökefeld and 
Schwalgin 2000). Therefore, there was already an organised form of dissent 
or opposition in the diaspora, which was not just contesting the AKP rule 
but also the Turkish state, its hegemony and its failure to create a democratic 
environment for its minorities and groups in opposition in general.
Despite building on the already existing diaspora mobilisation, Gezi can 
still be considered as a pivotal moment for the mobilisation of diasporas 
from Turkey for various reasons. Firstly, it created new solidarity networks 
and managed to gather different generations and groups under an overarch-
ing aim with an extraordinary spirit of solidarity, which revealed itself in 
artistic forms and humour. Secondly, it strengthened the already existing 
alliances between different diaspora groups by adding a crucial aspect to 
their agenda. The ‘grievances in common,’ which brought various actors 
together, also had an impact on the groups in the diaspora, softened their 
differences and highlighted their common goals in a new context. Thirdly, 
many diaspora groups used this moment as an opportunity to recruit new 
members and a great deal of the passive members became core members 
and dormant members became passive members throughout this process. 
It was the f irst time these groups, who have competing agendas, together 
or separately, protested in the name of the ‘Gezi Spirit.’ Therefore, it had an 
impact on the mobilisation patterns, which can either be momentary or 
continual, the result of which will only be discovered in time.
While we should acknowledge the path-dependency that they have 
towards the homeland’s political frames, the transnationalisation patterns 
in each host country take on different forms. Feron argues that diaspora 
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activism in each host country goes through a process of autonomisation 
where mobilisation takes on different features and dimensions than it does 
in the country of origin. In the hostland, diaspora discourses usually add 
their own agenda to the ones that are imported from the homeland and 
emphasis is put on different issues, themes, stakes and events, different 
types of actors are involved, the maintenance of group boundaries and 
culture changes (Feron 2013, 71). In the following pages, I demonstrate 
that a great deal of diasporic actions were imported from the homeland 
such as repertoires of protest, agenda-setting mechanisms, issues at stake, 
‘grievances in common’ as well as the discourses of political movements in 
Turkey. However, a certain ‘autonomisation’ process has occurred and in 
each country different actors were leading the ‘Gezi Spirit’ and the political 
environment within which the activism was taking place also affected 
their agenda-setting.
Sweden is not the f irst country that comes to mind when we think about 
Turkish political activism abroad. The majority of Turkish migrants in 
Sweden are from a small town in Konya called Kulu and the community is 
rather politically passive compared to Turkish diasporas in the Netherlands 
or in Germany. There are no established Turkish leftist associations with 
mass support. Although there are diaspora members with leftist tenden-
cies, they usually cooperate with the Swedish leftist circles rather than 
forming diasporic alliances. The Alevi federation is mobilised, but it is 
small in size with almost no leverage. Kemalist associations bourgeoned 
after the AKP came to power in Turkey and they were visible in a couple of 
protests against the Kurdish movement in Turkey or against the passing of 
the Armenian Genocide Bill in the Swedish Parliament (Baser 2014; Akis 
and Kalaylioglu 2010). In contrast, Kurdish diaspora in Sweden is very active 
and has an influence on policymakers. They are densely organised and 
they separated their diasporic spaces from the Turkish community from 
the 1970s onwards. As I argued elsewhere (Baser 2013), there is almost no 
cooperation between Turkish and Kurdish diaspora organisations, either 
on Turkish politics or on Swedish politics. This isolation also revealed itself 
during the Gezi protests, where no Kurdish associations were present and 
the Turkish groups protested in solidarity.
The main actors of the protests in Sweden were the TGB, ADD and 
Mukavemet Group. It is likely that many people who have no attachment 
to any of these groups also participated in the protests. ‘Mukavemet’ was 
founded by predominantly f irst-generation young immigrants from Turkey 
right after the Gezi protests. Many of them were individually active or 
were members of Swedish political organisations and parties but the Gezi 
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events constituted a diasporic change for them and they joined forces to 
make the protestors’ voice heard. The group has around 200 members on 
Facebook and it uses social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook 
to gather members and to organise events. This group brought together 
diaspora individuals who sporadically engaged in diasporic activities and 
showed leftist tendencies. After a year, it is still active and is becoming more 
embedded into the Turkish diasporic community in Sweden.
During the Gezi events, the TGB and ADD in Sweden took advantage 
of the window of opportunity and made themselves visible in the public 
sphere. They managed to recruit many second-generation members during 
the protests and many young people started showing an interest in tak-
ing part in events related to Turkish politics. TGB is organised separately 
from the Mukavemet group but on certain occasions provides support 
to their events. They have been trying to keep the Gezi spirit alive over 
the past year by constantly organising panels and seminars in various 
cities in Sweden. For instance, in March 2014, they showed a documentary 
related to Gezi events, which gathered considerable attention from the 
second-generation.6
Kurdish diaspora organisations were not present at the Gezi protests in 
Sweden and there were discussions on social media forums which revolved 
around the idea that ‘This is not the Kurds’ problem, this is the Turks’ 
problem.’ However, interviewees who participated in the protests of the 
Mukavemet group mentioned that they saw some Kurdish diaspora mem-
bers who individually joined the protests and they tried to be as inclusive 
as possible by playing down ideological discourses. The only protest event 
that brought TGB, ADD, Mukavemet and the PKK sympathising Kurdish as-
sociations together was Prime Minister Erdoğan’s off icial visit to Sweden on 
7 November 2013. These groups protested against this visit separately, not in 
a co-joint manner, but they episodically used the same slogan ‘Everywhere 
Taksim! Everywhere resistance!’7
In France, we see a different picture. There are more Turkish and Kurdish 
immigrants with a heterogeneous background and they formed strong 
diaspora organisations in the 1970s. Leftist organisations from Turkey (with 
many different fractions), Alevi associations (although weaker than in 
Germany and the Netherlands), Kurdish diaspora organisations (mostly 
6 See http://www.isvecpostasi.com/haber/623/gezi-parki-olaylarini-anlatan-baslangic-
belgeseli-ilgiyle-izlendi.html.
7 http://www.posta.com.tr/siyaset/HaberDetay/Isvec-te-Erdogan-a-PKK-lilardan-protesto.
htm?ArticleID=203674.
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sympathising with the PKK) and Kemalist associations (both ADD and 
TGB) were highly active during the Gezi protests in France. There was 
collaboration among many groups from divergent backgrounds.8 The 
essence of the Gezi movement in Turkey was the fact that it also brought 
many people together who were not members of any political party or civil 
society organisation before. This was also reflected in the transnational 
space. In France, many individuals who were not politically active prior to 
Gezi protested the government and police brutality in the main squares 
of big cities.9
The Kurdish associations were very active during protests in solidarity 
with the Gezi movement back in Turkey. For instance, the Ahmet Kaya Cul-
tural Association played a leading role in opening the branch of Halkların 
Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party) in Paris and they prepared 
a declaration regarding the importance of the Gezi protests in Turkey. The 
leftist organisation Fédération des Associations de Travailleurs et de Jeunes, 
the French branch of the Federation of Democratic Workers’ Organisa-
tions (Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu, DİDF), also participated 
actively and gave their full support to initiatives related to Gezi. The Taksim 
Solidarity Platform was founded co-jointly by various leftist and workers’ 
associations10 as well as Alevi associations.11 ADD and TGB in France 
protested separately and did not join forces with the leftist and Kurdish 
associations.12
Similar to France, in the Netherlands one can observe densely organised 
diaspora nodes of Turkish, Kurdish and Alevi groups. Networks of leftist 
and workers’ associations, for instance, branches of DİDF, were omnipresent 
at the protests. Members of FEDKOM, a Kurdish organisation sympathis-
ing with the PKK, also showed their full support. Some Kurdish diaspora 
members were hesitating because of the intense participation of the neo-
nationalists, who were clearly using an anti-Kurdish discourse in their party 
propaganda. Not all the Kurdish organisations supported the Gezi protests 
and many were sceptical due to the large presence of Kemalist associations 
such as the ADD and the TGB.
8 http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_gezi-parki-insaati-fransada-protesto-edildi_2096182.
html.
9 http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/42799.aspx.
10 http://www.etha.com.tr/Haber/2014/06/02/guncel/fransada-gezi-sehitleri-anildi/.
11 http://www.ozgurgelecek.net/duenya/5636-fransada-taksim-gezi-direniiyle-dayanma.
html. 
12 For further details regarding the groups who participated see http://www.fransaaddbirlik.
com/admin/tgb-ve-haute-savoie-addden-gezi-parki-eylemlerine-destek.html.
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Especially in June 2013, there had been a considerable number of protests 
in Amsterdam, which brought leftist organisations and TGB together at 
protests as they concurrently chanted ‘Everywhere Taksim! Everywhere 
resistance!’ and ‘Erdoğan Resign!’13 Websites such as ‘Dutch Support for 
Taksim Occupy,’ with more than a thousand supporters, were used to an-
nounce gatherings, share information related to political developments in 
Turkey and for members to get to know each other. In the Netherlands, a 
new group emerged among the f irst-generation young Turks and Kurds who 
are professionals or students in various cities. Together with the f irst- and 
second-generation migrants from Turkey in the Netherlands, they formed 
the Amsterdam Gezi Forum. The participants negotiated their solidarity 
to political parties and movements and agreed not to bring ‘party politics’ 
into their forums with the aim of having fruitful discussions on urgent 
matters related to Gezi. The participants of the forums managed to keep 
activism incessant and organised regular meetings with solid agendas 
and discussion points. They prepared professional websites, which were 
frequently updated.14 Issues such as urban transformation, LGBTI matters, 
minority rights, discrimination, ecology and conscientious objection were 
among the many topics discussed by forum participants.
The heart of Turkish-Kurdish diaspora politics is in Germany due to 
the size of both groups as well as their very neatly organised diasporic 
engagement with homeland politics. In German diasporic spaces, one 
can also observe the importation of predictable alliances from Turkey. 
Especially among the first-generation, there are dense networks of solidarity 
between the PKK-aff iliated groups and the Turkish left. Kurdish umbrella 
organisations and DİDF, which have separate agendas in Turkey as well as 
in Germany, often unite their powers to raise their voice against discrimina-
tion in Germany and oppression in Turkey. They organise joint protests 
and seminars with Alevi associations and other Kurdish and workers’ as-
sociations. For instance, the Democratic Solidarity Platform (Demokratik 
Güç Birliği Platformu) brings together various organisations from differ-
ent walks of life and makes a call for individuals to join forces against 
discrimination and oppression both at home and in the diaspora. They 
clearly merge homeland-hostland issues in the same melting pot in order 
to position themselves in a broader framework. During the Gezi protests, 
they were increasingly active and they mobilised masses in Berlin, Cologne 
13 For an example see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4xKSTkIe8A. Accessed 15 June 
2014.
14 For instance see http://amsterdamforum.org/forum/. Accessed 16 June 2014.
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and elsewhere to protest the off icial visit of Prime Minister Erdoğan to 
Germany, the police brutality and murders during the Gezi protests in 
Turkey as well as the subsequent seminal political developments in Turkey. 
An Alevi federation called Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu was at the 
core of the Gezi protests in Germany and they were highly active both 
individually and within the Democratic Solidarity Platform.
TGB has a considerable number of supporters in Germany and they 
were very visible during the Gezi events. They frequently organised events, 
seminars and protest marches over the past year in order to gather media 
attention, to protest against Erdoğan’s visit to Germany and to contest AKP’s 
rule in Turkey. It can be said that they used Gezi as a window of opportunity 
to recruit new members and to make an appearance in the political spheres 
of the German diasporic space. According to an interviewee from DİDF 
Berlin, organisations such as ADD, TGB, leftist fractions and workers’ as-
sociations protested together during the f irst couple of days of the Gezi 
events, gathering more than 10,000 people. She also confirmed that among 
the protestors there were many participants who were not members of any 
organisation but who randomly showed up at these mass protests to show 
solidarity with the Gezi resistance. According to another interviewee from 
Germany, it was the f irst time these groups had come together to protest 
against the Turkish government. He compared the Gezi events and the 
police brutality with the neo-Nazi murders in Germany and stated that the 
racist attacks in Germany did not even bring this many diaspora members 
together to protest in the name of democracy and human rights. He said 
this was the f irst time leftist symbols and f lags had been seen waving 
concomitantly with Kurdish and Turkish f lags and nationalist symbols. 
Although this momentum did not last after the f irst wave of protests and 
each group retired into their own extant solidarity webs, many see it as 
an important moment, one which showed divisions but simultaneously 
highlighted potential collaborations among different diaspora groups.
Observations on the main actors of the Gezi protests in the diaspora 
show that, apart from those in Sweden, Kurdish diaspora organisations were 
very much present at the Gezi protests and they gave their full support to 
the transnationalisation of this resistance movement. This clearly shows 
that even if there were fragmentations between the diaspora groups from 
Turkey, they were more ideological in character than ethnic. Secondly, 
we observe that in each country one group was more dominant than the 
other, depending on the characteristics of the diaspora groups in a given 
context. However, when we look at the bigger picture we see two camps 
who forged contingent alliances during the f irst spark of events and then 
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retired to their corners: TGB, ADD and other Kemalist organisations, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, leftist-Kurdish-Alevi movements joining 
forces despite their differences. Thirdly, in these four countries there were 
many participants who joined these protests without having any prior 
connection to a diaspora organisation.
Creating ‘Gezi Parks’ in Europe
The Gezi protests were a great illustration of the transformative power of 
creative art.15 Especially during the protests in Istanbul, various kinds of 
artistic performances accompanied protest events. They complemented 
the non-violent resistance strategy of the Gezi protestors and a spectrum 
of dance performances, piano recitals, folk songs and hip-hop music were 
used as an instrument of expression of dissent.
The ‘standing man’ was among the protest repertoires that became 
a symbol of the Gezi movement. As Snyder argues,16 ‘the standing man 
displaced the violence articulated by the government. The same set of 
political, religious and cultural background assumptions were in play, but 
the contemplating f igure displaced the force thrown at the resistance.’ 
This iconic protest diffused to the transnational spaces and was adopted 
by various actors in the diaspora. From Caracas to Toronto, there were 
‘standing man’ imitations by diaspora members from Turkey as well as civil 
society associations in front of Turkish consulates and in the main squares 
in metropolises.17 The protestors carried banners that had the names of 
‘martyrs’ of the Gezi events on them. In France, this protest form was mostly 
adopted by the ADD and TGB supporters and it gained a signif icant share 
of media attention. In Germany, only a few people in Hamburg adopted it 
but they managed to draw media attention.18
In the Netherlands and Germany, participants created Gezi park simula-
tions or tents, which brought many diaspora members together without 
questioning their background or political party loyalties. Each movement 
opened up its own tent after a while when the f irst wave of protests was 
over. These initiatives gathered attention from media outlets as well as 
15 http://roarmag.org/2014/01/nietzsche-gezi-power-art/.
16 http://roarmag.org/2014/01/nietzsche-gezi-power-art/.
17 For details see http://everywheretaksim.net/tr/bianet-gezi-direnisi-icin-7-ulke-7-duran-
insan-7-dakika/.
18 http://www.haber7.com/avrupa/haber/1045351-almanya-duran-adama-bile-tahammul-
edemedi.
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the locals and helped to disseminate the Gezi messages. The slogans that 
are used in Turkey, which use humour as a way of expressing dissent, were 
imported by diaspora members and they were also translated into the 
hostland’s language, which clearly made the diaspora groups a bridge that 
binds the protestors in the homeland to the outside world with their own 
words. In Berlin, protestors wore T-shirts that read ‘Çapulcu 36,’ which 
combined the postcode of Kreuzberg in Berlin with the discourses of the 
homeland resistance. In Amsterdam, protesters met at a park and wrote 
small notes on pieces of paper and hung them from trees in order to make 
their park resemble the Gezi Park. They also used creative art performances 
in order to attract the attention of the Dutch public. For instance, a leftist 
group brought brooms and carried banners that read ‘Only Revolution Will 
Clean This Mess!’ Other groups brought empty shoeboxes which became 
the symbol of the corruption cases in Turkey. In The Hague, a group from 
Taksim Solidarity organised an interesting protest event where protestors 
brought popcorn and chairs and placed a projector in front of the Turkish 
embassy at night, and projected a penguin documentary on its walls. This 
was a very sharp political statement that was intertwined with Gezi spirit 
humour. These initiatives clearly demonstrated that the protest mecha-
nisms in Turkey were closely followed by diaspora activists and it was not 
only dissent but also humour and creativity that diffused to the diaspora 
and constituted the ‘Gezi Spirit’ abroad.
In Sweden, diaspora members used music as common ground to gather 
people in solidarity with the protestors in Turkey. One of the leading mem-
bers of the Mukavemet group is a Turkish singer called Hakan Vreskala, 
who took part in the Gezi protests in Turkey and organised several artistic 
performances in the Taksim and Beyoğlu areas.19 He coordinated a flash 
mob in Stockholm using various instruments such as drums and darbuka in 
order to gather attention from migrants from Turkey and elsewhere, as well 
as the native Swedish public and policymakers.20 These events are highly 
important as artistic performances and music events are more likely to 
bring diaspora members from different backgrounds together and encour-
age them to share a moment of commonality without delving deeper into 
ethnic, religious and ideological cleavages.
In France, a photo exhibition was organised by Eren Araman called ‘# 
On y va “Gezi”!’ and it was advertised by the Taksim Solidarity Platform, 
DİDF, Ahmet Kaya Cultural Association and many others. Also, a diaspora 
19 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjfoXoz69sw. Accessed 16 June 2014.
20 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbL39vu4FD8. Accessed 16 June 2014.
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member and a scriptwriter for theatre plays and cinema called Sedef Ecer 
prepared a play for the popular radio station France Culture. It was called 
‘Three Trees in Istanbul’ and was divided into ten episodes, which will not 
only air in France but also in Belgium and Germany. This is a clear example 
that shows the diaspora members are playing the role of cultural brokers 
and translating the Gezi movement’s codes to a broader audience in Europe.
In the Netherlands, a group called the ‘International Gezi Ensemble’ 
was formed immediately after the Gezi protests and it consists of amateur 
and professional singers, musicians, f ilmmakers, dancers, theatre actors, 
painters and other artists. On their Facebook page, they describe their group 
as comprising participants who ‘carry the Gezi spirit and try to support 
human rights, nature and democracy which we lose day-by-day in almost 
all countries around the world. It is a fully volunteer-led and independent 
organisation.’21 This amateur group has given numerous concerts in solidar-
ity with the Gezi protestors and it also served a bigger purpose as it brought 
together various diaspora groups with competing agendas under one roof 
and in their terms united them ‘under the Gezi spirit.’ A Turkish interviewee 
from the Netherlands acknowledged that only protests that included art such 
as music or exhibitions gather people from different backgrounds together, 
as they do not contest but instead unite everyone who ‘feels for’ Gezi.
When I observed the discussion forums online as well as the events 
organised by the diaspora groups, it was clear that the Alevi, Kurdish and 
leftist as well as liberal groups focused on various themes that far tran-
scended the limited agenda that the AKP politicians are trying to impose on 
the Gezi protestors, such as: the protests are provoked by foreign countries, 
these people are extremists, or the protestors do not have a clear agenda. 
From day one, protestors in the diaspora started focusing on issues such as 
the murder of Hrant Dink, the earthquake in Van and what they could do 
for the victims, the Roboski massacre and the lack of justice in this case, 
Kurdish rights and LGBTI rights in Turkey. The developments in Turkey 
after the Gezi Park events were also gradually carried into the discussions 
on diaspora forums, such as the corruption cases which came to the fore 
before the local elections and the Soma incident, where hundreds of miners 
died because of the negligence of the government and the mine owning 
companies. TGB and ADD supporters instead followed a distinct path in 
this regard and they were much more cautious about the issues related to 
the Kurdish Question. They rather used the Gezi resistance as a way to 
21 For more information on the International Gezi Ensemble see https://www.facebook.com/
pages/International-GEZ%C4%B0-Ensemble/1383916755176534?sk=info. Accessed 16 June 2014.
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rekindle their own interpretation of Turkish nationalism and focused more 
on anti-AKP propaganda and secular values.
Gezi protests in the diaspora have an ever-changing agenda that evolves 
daily according to the inf luence of political developments in Turkey. It 
is not static; instead, it is expanding its scope to the future and the past 
by addressing many problematic issues, the lack of democracy and the 
violation of human rights in a broader perspective. Diasporic agendas are 
also selective. For instance, the local elections in Turkey were not covered in 
diasporic discourses as much as they were in Turkey, but diasporas also had 
their own local agendas depending on where they reside, which indicated 
the autonomisation of diaspora activism in the hostland setting.
Germany constitutes the most important country for Turkish and Kurd-
ish diaspora groups. It has signif icant leverage in Turkish politics, which 
is why diaspora groups opposing AKP rule want to have an influence on 
the policymakers in Germany. It can also be said that, especially during 
the last decade, AKP rule particularly polarised Turkish communities 
at home and abroad and the tension between them is considered to be a 
domestic security problem for Germany, although it is not as dominant as 
the Turkish-Kurdish tensions. Erdoğan’s visits to Germany usually create 
anxiety among German policymakers as well as the diaspora communities. 
For instance, his latest visit to Germany in May 2014 created dismay among 
many German politicians as well as Turkish leftist, Kemalist, Alevi and 
Kurdish groups. More than 100,000 people gathered to protest against him 
in Cologne (Democratic Solidarity Platform including Alevi and Kurdish 
organisations, DİDF and its youth organisation and other workers’ associa-
tions), while thousands of other people lay rose petals in his path in a protest 
supporting Erdoğan. Ideological cleavages are very sharp and they are 
becoming much more visible as a result of the political situation in Turkey.
In Sweden, the protestors added elements of Swedish politics to their 
agenda. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt tweeted the following message 
during the Gezi protests: ‘Talked with @EgemenBagis about need to cool down 
rhetoric, maintain dialogue and try to move forward together. Alternative 
dangerous.’ Gezi supporters in Sweden were angry since the Foreign Minister 
did not say anything about police brutality in Turkey. As a response, they 
started campaigns on Twitter and Facebook called ‘#wewantanswersCarlBildt’ 
and sent him messages asking him to react to state violence and the killing of 
protestors by the police in Turkey. This campaign started in Sweden but thanks 
to social media gathered support from other people all around the world.
In the Netherlands, there was another important matter of debate, as 
Rotterdam Islam University Rector Ahmet Akgündüz’s declaration on the 
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Gezi protests caused irritation. He described the protestors as ‘Godless, 
hooligan enemies of Islam’ and said that the Gezi events resembled the 
31 March events of the Ottoman Empire. He blamed foreign countries such 
as the US and Israel and the EU for supporting the hooligans and celebrating 
while Turkey was dealing with them.22 He also made declarations related to 
Alevism and he was accused by Alevi as well as other communities of hate-
speech against Alevis. The Gezi Solidarity Forum published declarations 
condemning his actions and protested against him. These protests managed 
to gather media attention and many Dutch politicians commented on this 
issue. For a long time, the Dutch diasporic space kept busy with a debate on 
resisting anti-Alevi discourse and Gezi protests were suddenly intertwined 
with Alevi activism and other groups showing solidarity for their cause.23
In France, protests were organised jointly with the leftist and Kurdish 
organisations and always included the issue of the murder of three Kurdish 
activists in Paris in their slogans and demands. Asking for justice for this 
case from French authorities was merged with the slogans from Gezi. A 
Turkish interviewee from a workers’ association stated that she regularly 
joins protests regarding the murders and they also include Gezi events in 
their discussions. In sum, there was a common goal of the call for justice by 
the diaspora groups but every diaspora also had its local agenda.
Conclusion
The Gezi Park events and the spirit that they have inspired has diffused to 
transnational space and affected many diaspora groups from Turkey with 
diverging interests and agendas. Throughout the protests and thereafter, 
diasporas played a big role in terms of translating the messages of Gezi 
protestors and brokering its cultural and political codes to the outside 
world. The mass reaction to the Gezi events was also a sign for the hostland 
governments that the diasporas from the same homeland should not be 
perceived as a monolithic body but that there are considerable fragmenta-
tions within them. The response that the diaspora groups have shown to 
Gezi is not static but took on a sustained form, which constantly nourishes 
its discourse and agenda from the developments in Turkey as well as in 
22 http://gazeteyenigun.com.tr/gundem/120839/gezi;-dinsizlerin-sarhoslarin-alevilerin-
ermenilerin-isi. 
23 For details see http://everywheretaksim.net/tr/hollanda-gezi-dayanismasi-rotterdam-
islam-universitesi-rektoru-prof-ahmet-akgunduzu-protesto-ediyoruz/.
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the host country. In the diaspora, the ‘Gezi Spirit’ strengthened already 
mobilised groups, caused an awakening in dormant members and created 
or strengthened already existing alliances between different diaspora 
groups. As in Turkey, not all the protestors could unite under collective 
aims, however different webs of solidarity on ‘common grievances’ were 
formed that engendered alternative or sometimes competing discourses. 
What the ADD and TGB take from the Gezi Spirit is not the same as the 
Leftist and Kurdish coalition and their expectations from this process. The 
diffusion of Gezi events created venues of opposition in the transnational 
space, which caused a merger of debate matters related to Turkish politics 
under a more comprehensive network. Similar to Gezi events in Turkey, ‘it 
was never about three trees.’ These venues became platforms for discussing 
issues that are related to coming to terms with the past – for instance 
by discussing the Sivas Massacre, giving support to ‘ODTÜ Resistance,’24 
reacting to corruption in Turkey and discussing a possible resolution to 
the Kurdish Question. As in Turkey, Gezi resistance in the diaspora is also 
building on a long-term struggle for democratisation in Turkey.
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